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Résumé en
anglais
Stock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business
practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The
purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation
leading to a possibleequilibrium contract satisfying both managers and
shareholders. The two key variables of the model are the percentage of equity
capital offered by the shareholders to the managers and the exercise price of the
options that may be at a discount. We explicitly
introduce risk aversion and information asymmetries in the form of (i) an
economic uncertainty in the gain of cash flow, (ii) possibly biased information
between the two parties and (iii) a noise in the valuation price of the stock in the
market. The
existence of a process of negotiation between shareholders and managers leading
to a possible disclosure of private information is highlighted. As a conclusion, we
show that “efficient” stock option plans should be granted in a context of trade-
off between the percentage of capital awarded to managers and the discount in
stock price.
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